Guaranteeing the Right to Vote for Twenty-First Century America by Brandon Haase
Journal of Legislation
Volume 43 | Issue 2 Article 4
4-6-2017
Guaranteeing the Right to Vote for Twenty-First
Century America
Brandon Haase
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg
Part of the Election Law Commons, and the Legislation Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Legislation at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of
Legislation by an authorized editor of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brandon Haase, Guaranteeing the Right to Vote for Twenty-First Century America, 43 J. Legis. 240 (2016).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg/vol43/iss2/4
  
240 
GUARANTEEING THE RIGHT TO VOTE FOR TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY AMERICA 
Brandon Haase† 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The general elections of 2008 and 2012 saw incredibly high rates of minority partic-
ipation in the election process, seeming to fulfill the highest aims of the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 (“VRA”).1  Shortly after the beginning of President Obama’s second term, 
however, central provisions of this landmark piece of civil rights legislation were disman-
tled by the Supreme Court in Shelby County v. Holder.2  In the aftermath of this ruling, 
state and local legislatures all over the nation scrambled to enact laws tightening the vot-
ing process.3  Voter advocacy groups scrambled nationwide to challenge the spate of new 
laws made possible by the Court’s new approach.  Yet, despite the remedies still remain-
ing in the VRA, these challenges have met with mixed success at best, leaving strict vot-
ing and registration laws in place across the country and prompting many to call for the 
reversal of Shelby County and the reinforcement of the VRA.4   
This Note argues that the VRA can no longer adequately safeguard the enfranchise-
ment of Americans, and must be replaced by new legislation that will guarantee the right 
to vote.  Part I discusses the aims and effects of the VRA.  Part II outlines the rise of new 
challenges to voting rights following the turbulent Presidential election of 2000.  Part III 
focuses on the Court’s decision in Shelby County, particularly in relation to Section 5’s 
preclearance regime.  Part IV maps the contours of a Section 2 claim after Shelby County.  
Finally, Part V examines several recent legal challenges brought in federal courts to state 
voting laws, arguing that the provisions of Section 2 are inadequate to combat the new 
vote denial, particularly in jurisdictions without a historical connection to the preclear-
ance regime.  This Note concludes by positing that only new legislation will address the 
inadequacies of the VRA and truly ensure enfranchisement for all Americans. 
 
† J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2018; B.A., North Greenville University, 2014. My deepest gratitude 
goes out to my parents for their continual care, encouragement, and love. Thanks also to Professor Nagle for 
his wonderful assistance and advice, and thanks to my fellow Journal of Legislation staff members for their 
dedication and hard work. Finally, a special thanks to Dr. Paul Thompson for inspiring me to write, think, and 
care about the ongoing struggle for justice. 
1 Rachel Weiner, Black Voters Turned Out at Higher Rate than White Voters in 2012 and 2008, WASH. POST 
(Apr. 29, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2013/04/29/black-turnout-was-higher-
than-white-turnout-in-2012-and-2008/. 
2 Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013). 
3 Kara Brandeisky, Hanqing Chen & Mike Tigas, Everything That's Happened Since Supreme Court Ruled on 
Voting Rights Act, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.propublica.org/article/voting-rights-by-state-map. 
4 New Voting Restrictions in Place for 2016 Presidential Election, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (Sept. 12, 
2016), http://www.brennancenter.org/voting-restrictions-first-time-2016. 
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PART I: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 
 But for a short period of high political participation following the Civil War, 
African Americans would not see the benefits promised in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments for nearly another century.5  The laws utilized by southern state legislatures 
to suppress the votes of African Americans encompassed a dizzying range of sinister 
practices, including literacy tests, poll taxes, byzantine voter-registration processes, ex-
clusion of African Americans from “non-state” party primaries, and other measures.6  
These practices combined with physical violence and economic coercion from whites to 
guarantee minimal participation by African Americans in the political process for over 
half a century.7  
In the decades leading up to the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, there were no 
African American representatives from the South in federal office and only a miniscule 
number in state legislatures.8  In every southern state, racially-motivated voting laws 
reigned, ensuring that African Americans had little or no access to the vote, despite mak-
ing up a quarter to over half of the population in many southern states.9  Additionally, 
judicial precedents like the “state-action” doctrine set a high bar for voting-rights advo-
cates to clear when challenging discriminatory voting practices.10  Where challenges in 
federal courts were successful, southern legislatures quickly enacted new laws, pledging 
to take whatever efforts were necessary to thwart African American access to the ballot.11 
 In response to rising pressure from the Civil Rights Movement, Congress passed 
several omnibus acts which sought to ensure the voting rights and other civil liberties of 
African Americans throughout the nation, particularly in the South.12  These acts included 
measures significantly broadening the ability of the Attorney General to challenge state 
voting laws in court, as well as other provisions authorizing the inspection of election 
proceedings by federal officials.13  Despite these efforts, the acts failed to achieve the 
desired increase in voter registration, primarily because of the expense and time involved 
in challenging every discriminatory state law in federal court.14 
 After the failure of the first three attempts, Congress passed the VRA of 1965, 
one of the strongest pieces of civil rights legislation in American history, which included 
 
5 Paul Finkelman, The Necessity of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Difficulty of Overcoming Almost a 
Century of Voting Discrimination, 76 LA. L. REV. 181, 202-03 (2015). 
6 Id. at 205-08. 
7 Id. at 206-09, 212-13. 
8 Id. at 188-89. 
9 Id. 
10 See Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 53, 55 (1935) (holding that the Democratic Party was not a “state” 
organization and, therefore, their exclusion of blacks from the primary process was not a “state-action” within 
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
11 Finkelman, supra note 5, at 217. 
12 Warren M. Christopher, The Constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4-7 
(1965). 
13 Id. at 5. 
14 Id. at 7-8. 
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both judicial and administrative remedies.15  Sections 2 and 3 of the Act focused on judi-
cial remedies by granting a right of action to sue state governments for discriminatory 
voting practices and by broadening the jurisdiction of the courts to oversee the effective 
enforcement of the Act.16  Though these provisions were not dissimilar from lackluster 
provisions contained in earlier legislation, the scope of remedies available granted much 
more power to claimants, the Attorney General, and federal courts to ensure that judicial 
challenges to state laws were able to go forward.17 
Although provisions similar to Sections 2 and 3 were present in prior voting rights 
laws, the measures adopted in Sections 4 and 5 distinguished the 1965 Act from its pre-
decessors.  Section 4 contained a “coverage formula” which mandated that any state with 
1) a discriminatory election law where 2) less than 50% of the state’s eligible voters were 
registered or voted in the previous presidential election could not bar any citizen from 
voting for failure to comply with a list of commonly-used voter-suppression measures.18  
Stronger still, Section 5 contained the famous “pre-clearance” provision, requiring juris-
dictions covered under Section 4 to submit any change in their election laws to a federal 
court for a declaratory judgment that the new procedure does not discriminate on the basis 
of race.19   
Later amendments to the Act in 1975 and 1982 expanded the law’s reach to cover 
jurisdictions with non-African American minority groups, provided for bilingual ballots 
where needed, and attacked vote dilution in the redistricting process.20  Notably, the 1982 
amendments also added a “results” test to Section 2, specifying that any state law or prac-
tice that had a discriminatory effect could be within the reach of litigation.21  Most recently 
in 2006, Congress reauthorized the VRA for an additional twenty-five years with few 
changes.22 
Following the implementation of the VRA, African American voter registration in 
all covered jurisdictions jumped immediately from just under 30% to over 50%, closer to 
the overall white voter registration rates of over 70%.23  Despite these initial successes, 
the struggle for equal access to the ballot was far from over.  State legislatures opposed 
to the VRA were able to find new ways to circumvent or mitigate its effects; one of the 
most common of these tactics was vote dilution.24 
The real strength of voter dilution practices, such as gerrymandering, lay in their 
subtlety; they were (and are) more likely to “reduce, rather than deny, electoral oppor-
tunity” making them “more difficult to detect.”25  While the forms taken by vote dilutive 
 
15 Id. at 9. 
16 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, §2-3, 79 Stat. 437, 437-38 (1965) (codified as amended at 52 
U.S.C. § 10301-10314).  
17 Id. at § 3; see Christopher, supra note 12, at 7-8. 
18 Voting Rights Act of 1965 §4. 
19 Id. at § 5. 
20 Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 
689, 702-05 (2008). 
21 Id. at 704-08. 
22 Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2621 (2013). 
23 Tokaji, supra note 20, at 702; BERNARD GROFMAN, LISA HANDLEY AND RICHRAD G. NIEMI, MINORITY REP-
RESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY 23-24 (1992). 
24 Tokaji, supra note 20, at 703. 
25 Howard M. Shapiro, Geometry and Geography: Racial Gerrymandering and the Voting Rights Act, 94 YALE 
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measures vary, at their core, they are certain “electoral structural schemes, combined with 
past and present social and economic conditions” which diminish the effects of minority 
votes, further inhibiting their ability to participate meaningfully in elections.26  After 
voter-advocacy groups successfully challenged dilutive practices in several southern 
states based on their disproportionately negative effects on minority voters, the Supreme 
Court concluded in Mobile v. Bolden that claimants must demonstrate that the measures 
were intentionally discriminatory in order to prevail under Section 2 of the VRA.27  Due 
to the difficulties inherent in demonstrating explicit discrimination, challenges to dilutive 
election practices became significantly harder.28   
The Court’s holding in Bolden impelled Congress to significantly amend the VRA 
in 1982.29  The 1982 amendment added a “results” test to Section 2 of the VRA, widening 
the scope of possible claims to include laws that were not discriminatory on their face but 
were discriminatory in their effects.30  The courts charged with interpreting this new 
phrasing looked to the seven factors listed in the Senate Report accompanying the amend-
ment, known collectively as the “Senate Factors,” which provided criteria for assessing 
whether a measure had discriminatory effects.31  The construction of these factors specif-
ically targeted vote dilution practices common after the Court’s holding in Bolden, but it 
explicitly avoided the controversial step of requiring proportional representation for racial 
minorities in Congress.32 
The 1982 amendment to the VRA played an important role in increasing minority 
representation in federal and state legislatures; however, the results test and accompany-
ing factors were primarily aimed at instances of vote dilution not vote denial.33  As a 
result, courts in the years following the 1982 amendment struggled to understand and 
consistently apply the “results” test and Senate Factors to laws that implicated access to 
the ballot (vote denial measures).34  This confusion would become immensely important 
 
L.J. 189, 197 (1984). 
26 David D. O’Donnell, Wading into the “Serbonian Bog” of Vote Dilution Claims Under Amended Section 2 
of the Voting Rights Act: Making the Way Towards a Principled Approach to “Racially Polarized Voting”, 65 
MISS. L.J. 345, 352 (1995). 
27 City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66-67 (1980); Tokaji, supra note 20, at 704. 
28 Tokaji, supra note 20, at 720. 
29 Id. at 703-04. 
30 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (1982); Tokaji, supra note 20, at 704-05. 
31 These factors included: 1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivi-
sion that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate 
in the democratic process; 2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is 
racially polarized; 3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election 
districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that 
may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group; 4. if there is a candidate slating 
process, whether the members of the minority group have been denied access to that process; 5. the extent to 
which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in 
such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the po-
litical process; 6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; 7. the 
extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction. Tokaji, 
supra note 20, at 706-07 (citing S. REP. NO. 07 97-417, at 28-29 (1982)).  See infra notes 80-81 for a fuller 
discussion of these factors.  See also Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 245 (5th Cir. 2016). 
32 O’Donnell, supra note 26, at 347.  
33 Tokaji, supra note 20, at 708-09. 
34 Tokaji, supra note 20, at 709. 
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almost two decades later, as states began to implement a new wave of election laws in-
creasing the number of barriers to the ballot box. 
PART II: NEW VOTE DENIAL MEASURES 
The closely contested Presidential election of 2000 prompted Congress to pass the 
Help America Vote Act of 2002 (“HAVA”), a sweeping election law aimed at reforming 
election processes and eliminating voter fraud in the states.35  Importantly, HAVA re-
quired states to enact a minimum level of voter-identification (“voter ID”) standards.36  
In response, state legislatures across the nation enacted a series of new voter-identifica-
tion requirements, the majority of which surpassed the minimum standards set forth in 
HAVA.37  In addition to imposing strict voter ID requirements, states also enacted tighter 
restrictions on the voter registration process and alternative forms of voting (for example, 
absentee voting, early voting, etc.).38   
 In contrast to “first-generation” vote suppression measures that facially and ex-
plicitly discriminated against minority voters by restricting access to the vote, and “sec-
ond-generation” measures that primarily “limit the collective impact of the choices mi-
nority voters make at the voting booth when aggregating their votes,”39 the new voting 
laws following the enactment of HAVA constitute a novel form of vote denial.  These 
forms of vote suppression are racially neutral in their construction, and rely on indirect 
methods such as voter-ID requirements to affect the same results.40  Importantly, as will 
be discussed below, the provisions of the VRA have proven mostly ineffective in com-
bating this new form of vote denial.41 
 The primary vote denial methods imposed after HAVA fell into three categories: 
election administration laws, changes to voting machines, and felony disenfranchise-
ment.42  While voter machine modifications and felony disenfranchisement represent sig-
nificant challenges to voter access, this Note will focus primarily on laws affecting elec-
tion administration, including voter-ID requirements, the modification of registration 
procedures, and changes to voting processes.   
Voter-ID measures involve laws requiring the presentation of certain types of ID to 
vote in an election.43  These laws are generally categorized into “strict” and “non-strict” 
forms, with “strict” laws directly requiring voters to present (rather than requesting) one 
 
35 Samuel P. Langholz, Fashioning a Constitutional Voter-Identification Requirement, 93 IOWA L. REV. 731, 
745 (2008). 
36 Id. at 745-46. 
37 Id. at 747-48. 
38 Armand Derfner & J. Gerald Hebert, Voting Is Speech, 34 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 471, 474-75 (2016). 
39 Jenigh J. Garrett, The Continued Need for the Voting Rights Act: Examining Second-Generation Discrimina-
tion, 30 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 77, 82 (2010). 
40 See Tokaji, supra note 20, at 691-92.  Tokaji collectively refers to these newer forms of voting restrictions as 
the “new vote denial.”  Id. at 692.  See Garrett, supra note 39, at 81. 
41 Daniel P. Tokaji, Responding to Shelby County: A Grand Election Bargain, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 71, 82 
(2014). 
42 Tokaji, supra note 20, at 691-92. 
43 Id. at 712. 
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of a limited number of  (usually) state-issued IDs.44  Voters without the necessary ID are 
allowed to cast a “provisional ballot,” which will be counted only if the proper documen-
tation is presented within a short window after the election.45  Non-strict laws allow elec-
tion officials to request the presentation of an ID but do not mandate that the ID be pre-
sented.46 
A large body of research suggests that these voter ID requirements—which constitute 
a major aspect of the new wave of vote denial—have a much greater potential to nega-
tively impact minorities and lower-income voters.47  Some studies suggest that the num-
ber of voting-age Americans without an acceptable ID for voting purposes could be be-
tween 6-10%; others place the number even higher, and minorities are more likely than 
whites to be within this subset.48  This disparity stems from a variety of different eco-
nomic factors and differs widely by geography.49  In rural areas, for example, African 
Americans who are disproportionately disadvantaged economically often own cars in 
lower numbers and have minimal access to public transportation, thus making it much 
more difficult to obtain the requisite documents needed for an acceptable identification.50 
Given the fact that the VRA’s strongest provisions (related to preclearance) apply to 
jurisdictions with a clear history of official and private discrimination against African 
Americans and other minorities, one might expect racial disparities in the ownership of 
identification to differ in covered and non-covered jurisdictions.  The research, however, 
suggests otherwise: the disparities are roughly equal in historically covered and non-cov-
ered jurisdictions.51  In fact, formerly covered jurisdictions fare better than non-covered 
jurisdictions, suggesting that election laws requiring the presentation of an ID to vote 
would have roughly equal, if not worse, effects in formerly non-covered areas compared 
to covered jurisdictions.52 
 While the VRA and its subsequent amendments were tailored to attack the forms 
of vote denial and dilution present in the 1960s and 1980s, the VRA’s provisions were 
ill-equipped to protect these potential victims of the new vote denial.  The preclearance 
regime outlined in Section 5 effectively policed the highly polarized redistricting process 
for decades, but did little to halt the progress of the new vote denial methods listed 
above.53  From the implementation of HAVA to the watershed decision in Shelby County 
(see discussion below), only a miniscule percentage of vote denial measures triggered a 
Section 5 action from the Department of Justice, compared to tens of thousands of redis-
tricting laws and other vote dilution methods.54  Furthermore, over that same period, only 
three vote denial measures were successfully challenged under the Section 5 preclearance 
 
44 Voter ID History, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr. 18, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/re-
search/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id-history.aspx#Chart. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Charles Stewart III, Voter ID: Who Has Them? Who Shows Them?, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 21, 25-26 (2013). 
48 Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 660-61 (2007). 
49 Keesha Gaskins & Sundeep Iyer, The Challenge of Obtaining Voter Identification 4, 10-13, BRENNAN CEN-
TER FOR JUSTICE (2012), http://www.brennancenter.org/publication/challenge-obtaining-voter-identification.  
50 Id. at 4-5. 
51 Stewart, supra note 47, at 42-43.  
52 Stewart, supra note 47, at 42-43. 
53 Tokaji, supra note 41, at 80. 
54 Tokaji, supra note 41, at 80. 
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regime, constituting a tiny fraction of all election law changes affecting access to the 
vote.55 
 Another weakness of the Section 5 preclearance regime was its susceptibility to 
partisan influence, resulting in similar laws receiving disparate treatment based on the 
administration enforcing the VRA.  The Attorney General was not required to provide a 
justification for a determination on a law’s conformity to the VRA, nor were prior rulings 
binding as precedents.56  In contrast to many other agency administrative rulings, judicial 
review is entirely unavailable for the DOJ’s decisions on preclearance.  Unsurprisingly, 
under this system, similar laws in comparable jurisdictions have received different treat-
ment.  In 2005, under the Bush Administration, the administration-appointed head of the 
voting rights division pre-cleared a Georgia voter-ID law over the strong objections of 
DOJ analysts who predicted that the law would have a retrogressive effect on minority 
voters.57  By contrast, a similar South Carolina law was denied preclearance under the 
Obama Administration in 2011.58   
Despite the seeming ineffectiveness of Sections 2 and 5 in addressing vote denial 
measures, Congress reauthorized the entirety of the VRA in 2006.  During the Congres-
sional debate over the reauthorization of the VRA, legislators amassed a voluminous rec-
ord of continuing vote-suppression throughout the nation, particularly in regions falling 
under the Section 4 coverage formula.59  Notably, since the last reauthorization, the pre-
clearance mechanisms of the VRA had denied legislatures in covered jurisdictions from 
implementing over 700 new election laws.60  These “second-generation” and new vote 
denial measures were in part what prompted the legislature to reauthorize the VRA in 
full, without any substantial changes to its most important provisions, including the cov-
erage formula.61  Vote-denial measures in covered jurisdictions prior to and following 
HAVA still had to go through the VRA’s onerous pre-clearance process.  By 2013, how-
ever, a ruling by the Supreme Court would bring the whole edifice of preclearance to the 
ground. 
PART III: SHELBY COUNTY AND ITS EFFECTS 
 No case in recent history has reshaped American election law like the 2013 
Shelby County decision.62  Due to the decision’s far-reaching effects and continued per-
tinence, this section will break down the main issues involved in the case.  Of particular 
interest for our purposes is the Court’s language related to the presence (or absence) of 
continued racial discrimination in areas falling within Section 4’s coverage formula. 
 
55 Tokaji, supra note 41, at 80-81. 
56 Kathleen M. Stoughton, Note, A New Approach to Voter ID Challenges: Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 
81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 292, 310 (2013). 
57 Id. at 309. 
58 Id. at 310. 
59 H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 36 (2006). 
60 Id. 
61 Angelica Rolong, Comment, Access Denied: Why the Supreme Court's Decision in Shelby County v. Holder 
May Disenfranchise Texas Minority Voters, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 519, 547-49 (2014).  
62 Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013). A possible exception is Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 
(2010). 
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 In 2013, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case of Shelby County v. 
Holder.  In 2000, Shelby County submitted a slew of redistricting proposals and annexa-
tions to the U.S. Attorney General (“AG”) subject to the preclearance requirements of 
Section 4 of the VRA.63  The AG denied all of their requests, citing Shelby County’s 
failure to justify their changes with legitimate reasoning and reliable data.64  In response, 
Shelby County filed suit against the office of the AG seeking a declaratory judgment that 
Sections 4 and 5 of the VRA were unconstitutional and requesting a permanent injunction 
against the AG’s power to enforce them.65 After losing at both the D.C. District and Ap-
peals courts,66 Shelby County appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.  
 In a 5-4 decision authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court overturned the 
constitutionality of the pre-clearance formula in Section 4.  Chief Justice Roberts began 
by pointing out that the VRA constituted an unprecedented, yet warranted encroachment 
by the federal government into areas previously under the exclusive purview of the 
states.67  According to the majority, the continued viability of such extraordinary 
measures required a clear demonstration that they were still necessary in light of current 
conditions.68   
While acknowledging the historical importance of the coverage formula, the majority 
contended that “[n]early 50 years later, things have changed dramatically.” 69  Citing 
higher rates of minority registration, turnout, and representation, the majority argued that 
in its complete reauthorization of the coverage formula in 2006, Congress unjustifiably 
acted “as if nothing had changed.”70  The original law divided the country into “covered” 
and “non-covered” jurisdictions on the basis of the demonstrable disparities in restrictive 
election laws and voter registration between Southern and Northern states; these distinc-
tions, the Court argued, were no longer viable.71 
 Having determined that the conditions which justified the coverage formula in 
1965 were no longer valid, the Court went on to attack the AG’s argument for failing to 
“demonstrate the continued relevance of the formula to the problem it targets.”72  The 
Court also dismissed the evidence compiled by both Congress in 2006 and the AG, point-
ing to continued discrimination in the covered jurisdictions, arguing that while this evi-
dence may serve to justify a coverage formula, it could not justify a wholesale recertifi-
cation of the old coverage formula.73  In light of these considerations, the Court struck 
down the coverage formula in its entirety. 
The Court’s decision to strike down the coverage formula voided the applicability of 
the preclearance provisions of Section 5 of the VRA.74  Without the coverage formula, 
 
63 Rolong, supra note 61, at 541-42. 
64 Rolong, supra note 61, at 541-42. 
65 Rolong, supra note 61, at 542. 
66 Shelby, 133 S.Ct. at 2621-22.  
67 Id. at 2624. 
68 Id. at 2429. 
69 Id. at 2625. 
70 Id. at 2626. 
71 Id. at 2627-28. 
72 Id. at 2628. 
73 Id. at 2628-29. 
74 Rolong, supra note 61, at 542-43.  
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no state could possibly fall within the pre-clearance requirements of Section 5, ending the 
prophylactic nature of the VRA’s remedies to discriminatory voting laws.  While the lit-
igation route provided by Section 2 remained open as did pieces of other sections, the 
Civil Rights Movement’s “crown jewel” was effectively gutted by the Shelby majority.75 
Significantly, the majority directly addressed the dissent’s argument that evidence of 
second-generation and new vote denial measures justified Congress’ wholesale reaffir-
mation of the 1965 coverage formula.  The majority argued that while the evidence point-
ing to minority vote-dilution measures was important, these impediments were com-
pletely distinct from the blatant measures addressed by the 1965 VRA and only 
highlighted Congress’ failure to adjust the Act to match current circumstances.76  In short, 
the Court dismissed the continuing relevance of the VRA’s coverage formula, emphati-
cally concluding that Congress should have drafted a new coverage formula, rather than 
merely re-affirming the old.77 
Immediately following the Shelby decision, states that previously fell within the 
scope of the coverage formula began drafting and implementing new voting requirements 
and election laws.78  In quick succession, North Carolina passed a stringent voter ID law, 
shortened the period for early voting, and mandated the discarding of ballots cast at the 
wrong polling station.79  From Texas to South Carolina, covered jurisdictions scrambled 
to pass laws that had been held up for years by the preclearance regime.80 
PART IV: SECTION 2 CLAIMS AFTER SHELBY COUNTY 
After Shelby, with the fall of the preclearance regime, plaintiffs seeking to challenge 
laws implicating access to the vote must rely for protection on Section 2 of the VRA.81  
The provisions of Section 2, however, have failed to protect against a variety of laws that 
disproportionately negatively impact minority voters.82  This failure is largely due to how 
the courts have shaped the doctrines surrounding the applicability of the VRA to all types 
 
75 Daniel P. Tokaji, Responding to Shelby County: A Grand Election Bargain, 8 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 71, 71 
(2014) (quoting Heather Gerken, Goodbye to the Crown Jewel of the Civil Rights Movement, SLATE (June 25, 
2013) http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/06/supreme_court_and_the_vot-
ing_rights_act_goodbye_to_section_5.html).  
76 Shelby, 133 S.Ct. at 2629-30.  
77 Id. at 2629. 
78 Vincent Marinaccio, Protecting Voters' Rights: The Aftermath of Shelby v. Holder, 35 WHITTIER L. REV. 
531, 542-43 (2014). 
79 Id.  
80 Id. 
81 Shelby, 133 S.Ct. at 2631.  
82 See Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, Administering Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act After 
Shelby County, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2143, 2158 (2015); see also Ellen Katz et. al., Documenting Discrimination 
in Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982 Final Report of the Voting 
Rights Initiative, University of Michigan Law School, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 643, 654-56 (2006); J. Gerald 
Hebert and Armand Defner, More Observations on Shelby County, Alabama and the Supreme Court, CAM-
PAIGN LEGAL CTR. BLOG (Mar 1, 2013), http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/news/blog/more-observations-
shelby-county-alabama-and-supreme-court; Nicholas Stephanopoulos, The South after Shelby County 3, 9-10 
(U. Chi. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Workshop, Paper No. 451, 2013), 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/451-ns-south.pdf. 
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of voting rights issues, including vote dilution and vote denial claims, creating legal bar-
riers to plaintiffs seeking to vindicate their voting rights. 
The basic framework of a Section 2 claim involves analyzing the respective law un-
der a two-part framework.  The first step requires that “the challenged standard, practice, 
or procedure must impose a discriminatory burden on members of a protected class, 
meaning that members of the protected class have less opportunity than other members 
of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their 
choice . . . .”83  This first step involves a “totality of circumstances” 84 test, requiring an 
analysis of a host of interconnected factors surrounding the passage and application of 
the law.85 
If the first step is established, the court then analyzes whether there is a “sufficient 
causal link” between the burden imposed and the “social and historical conditions pro-
duced by discrimination.”86  This involves determining whether the negative effects of 
the law are “in part . . . caused by or linked to social and historical conditions that have 
or currently produce discrimination against members of the protected class.”87  This step 
requires weighing the circumstances of the particular case in light of the Senate Factors 
listed above, including elements such as the  “extent of any history of official discrimi-
nation . . . that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, 
or otherwise to participate in the democratic process,” or the “extent to which members 
of the minority group in the state . . . bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as 
education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in 
the political process.”88  Importantly, these factors are not exclusive, and no requisite 
number of these factors must be proven to demonstrate a violation of Section 2.89 
While these doctrines have been recently applied to many vote denial claims, as 
noted above, the legal precedent established following the 1982 Amendment to Section 
2 mainly dealt almost exclusively with instances of vote dilution, not denial.90  This lack 
of doctrinal clarity surrounding the applicability of Section 4 to vote denial measures has 
huge consequences for those in non-covered jurisdictions, which, after Shelby, includes 
all jurisdictions.91  Without the remedies of the provisions of Sections 4 and 5, plaintiffs 
 
83 Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 244 (5th Cir. 2016). 
84 Laura Hunter Dietz, Voter Identification Requirements as Denying or Abridging the Right to Vote on Account 
of Race or Color under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 12 A.L.R. FED. 3D ART. 4 (2016). 
85 For instance, in United States v. Berks Cty., Pennsylvania, 277 F. Supp. 2d 570, 580 (E.D. Pa. 2003), a federal 
District Court permanently enjoined a county from continuing to require photo identification only from Hispanic 
voters on election day, stating that the totality of the circumstances demonstrated that “a jurisdiction's political 
processes are not equally open to participation by minority voters.” Cases like this one demonstrate the impli-
cations of the totality of circumstances doctrine; courts evaluate not only the law, but rather “the entire voting 
and registration system” as well; see Dietz, supra note 84, at § 11. 
86 Veasey, 830 F.3d at 245.  
87 Id. at 244. 
88 Id. at 245. Here, the Court included two additional factors from prior rulings: “whether there is a significant 
lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority 
group,” and “whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's use of such voting qualification, 
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous.” 
89 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 45 (1986). 
90 Tokaji, supra note 20, at 691-92 (2006).   
91 Myrna Pérez and Vishal Agraharkar, If Section 5 Falls: New Voting Implications, 4-5 BRENNAN CENTER FOR 
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challenging vote denial measures must now operate within the murkier bounds of the 
Section 2 results test outlined above. 
The challenges facing plaintiffs under Section 2 are compounded by two intercon-
nected factors.  The first of these factors pertains to the general historical differences 
between covered and non-covered jurisdictions.  Due to the widespread existence in the 
South of official discrimination in the form of slavery and the Jim Crow regime, lawsuits 
in formerly covered jurisdictions tend to provide much more evidence pertaining to the 
Senate Factors listed above, particularly factor 1: “the extent of any history of official 
discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched the right of the members 
of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic 
process.”92  By contrast, plaintiffs in non-covered jurisdictions are often forced to point 
to less concrete or more distant examples of discrimination, such as general racial ine-
qualities that contribute to socio-economic disparities in voting access.93  
Although the low availability of evidence for official discrimination presented an 
obstacle in non-covered jurisdictions, the second factor weighing against plaintiffs made 
their odds of success significantly longer—namely, a strong judicial preference for ex-
amples of historical and/or official discrimination in addition to a showing of disparate 
impact in the relevant jurisdiction.94  Unsurprisingly, strict voter-identification laws 
passed in states with a clear history of official minority vote suppression have been the 
easiest to defeat, with clear victories for voting rights advocates coming in quick succes-
sion in North Carolina95 and Texas.96  Similar laws in states outside of historically “cov-
ered” jurisdictions have proven tougher to challenge; Ohio97 and Wisconsin98 laws re-
stricting early voting and heightening identifications requirements were affirmed by their 
respective federal circuit courts.  The following section will outline four cases implicating 
voting access—two within formerly covered jurisdictions and two without, demonstrat-
ing the weaknesses inherent in judicial precedent surrounding Section 2 and its ineffec-
tiveness in promoting equal access to the vote. 
 
JUSTICE (2013), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Section_5_New_Voting_Impli-
cations.pdf.  
As a reminder, covered jurisdictions included states that at the time of the VRA’s passage had 1) a discrimina-
tory election law, and 2) less than 50% of the state’s eligible voters were registered or voted in the previous 
presidential election, the strong remedies of preclearance and judicial review were available prior to Shelby (52 
U.S.C. § 10303).  Practically, these states were much less likely to amend their election laws in ways that would 
disadvantage minorities, as they would have to contend with the harsh measures of the preclearance regime.  
92 Veasey, 830 F.3d at 245; Rolong, supra note 61, at 548-49 (2014).  
93 See generally, Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1551 (2015).  
94 Katz et al., supra note 82, at 655-56 (statistical research demonstrated a higher percentage of victories for 
plaintiffs in Section 2 cases in covered jurisdictions, despite those jurisdictions accounting for less than one-
quarter of the nation’s population). 
95 See N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016).  
96 See Veasey, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc).   
97 See Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 837 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2016). 
98 See generally, Frank, 768 F.3d at 744. 
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PART V: COURTS, COVERAGE, AND SECTION 2 
Veasey v. Abbot involved a Section 2 challenge to a “strict” Texas voter-ID law.99  In 
2011, the Texas State Legislature passed Senate Bill 14 (“SB 14”), a bill designed to 
heighten the identification requirements for voting.100  In order to be eligible to vote, 
individuals had to present one of several valid forms of photo ID to poll workers, includ-
ing currently valid driver’s licenses, concealed weapons permits, and other forms of ID.101  
If the applicant lacked any of these, they could apply for an election-specific ID using 
two forms of “secondary ID,” including a birth certificate, naturalization papers, and a 
small list of other possible forms.102  Voters unable to provide these forms of ID could 
cast a “provisional ballot” on the day of the election which they could validate by sup-
plying the necessary ID within six days.103  The law passed, despite serious concerns that 
it would fail to pass through the VRA’s (now defunct) preclearance regime still in effect 
in Texas.104  
The law was fully implemented in June 2013, immediately following the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Shelby County.105  Shortly after its implementation, voter advocacy 
groups challenged the law in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas, 
alleging the law violated various Constitutional provisions and Section 2 of the VRA.106  
Texas responded to these allegations claiming the measures were necessary to prevent 
voter fraud.107 
In a lengthy opinion, the District Court held that the law violated several provisions 
of the U.S. Constitution and had an impermissibly discriminatory effect on minorities 
under Section 2 of the VRA.108  As a result, the judge entered a permanent injunction 
against the law’s enforcement shortly ahead of the November 2014 elections.109  Texas, 
however, managed to obtain a stay of the District Court’s injunction, allowing SB 14 to 
apply during the election cycle.110  After several more procedural steps, the case arrived 
in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for a determination of, among other things, whether 
the law was passed with discriminatory purpose under Section 2 of the VRA.111 
 
99 See generally, Veasey, 830 F.3d. 216. 
100 Veasey, 830 F.3d at 225.   
101 Id.  
102 Id. at 226.  
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 239-40. 
105 Id. at 227. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 227-28. 
109 Id. at 228. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 228-29 (On initial appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that the District Court made impermissible legal errors 
in their analysis of the legislature’s alleged “discriminatory purpose,” and remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings; the Fifth Circuit did affirm the District Court’s holding that the law had a discriminatory effect under 
Section 2 of the VRA). Id. at 229. 
 252 Journal of Legislation [Vol. 43:2] 
The court began by dismantling the District Court’s determination that SB 14 was 
enacted with discriminatory purpose in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, arguing 
that the court relied on infirm and unreliable evidence of bias.112  The court remanded this 
portion of the case for a reweighing of the evidence, but it also highlighted the evidence 
in the record that weighed in favor of a finding of purposeful discrimination on the part 
of the legislature.113   
Next, the court addressed whether the law had a discriminatory effect in violation of 
the “results test” of Section 2 of the VRA.114 As a necessary preliminary consideration, 
the court established the applicable standard while admitting that “[a] clear test . . . has 
yet to emerge.”115  They pointed to the “Two-Part Framework” utilized by other circuit 
courts.116  The first portion of this framework involves determining whether: “[t]he chal-
lenged standard, practice, or procedure . . .  impose[s] a discriminatory burden on mem-
bers of a protected class, meaning that members of the protected class have less oppor-
tunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to 
elect representatives of their choice.”117  This first step is mainly concerned with estab-
lishing a burden on the right to vote that has a disparate impact on minorities.118 
The second portion of the framework adopted by the Fifth Circuit involves establish-
ing that the burden in part one is “in part . . . caused by or linked to social and historical 
conditions that have or currently produce discrimination against members of the protected 
class.”119  For this portion of the analysis, the court stressed the importance of looking to 
the “Gingles” (“Senate”) factors mentioned above.120  In keeping with prior Section 2 
jurisprudence, the court stressed that the Senate Factors are not “exclusive,” and there is 
no requirement for a specific number to be satisfied by the circumstances of the case.121 
After establishing the relevant legal standard, the court moved on to a discussion of 
the merits of the case.  The court examined evidence that SB 14 placed a burden in the 
form of travel, time, and indirect costs to minority voters, and determined this evidence 
sufficient to support the District Court’s ruling that the law placed “significant and dis-
parate burdens on the right to vote.”122 
The court then examined the record in light of the Senate (a.k.a. Gingles) factors, 
affirming the District Court’s determination that several of the tests were satisfied in light 
of the evidence, especially those factors relating to a history of discrimination by the 
state.123  First, the court noted that the Texas legislature amply demonstrated a history of 
 
112 Id. at 230-35 (The difficulty in demonstrating discriminatory purpose is one of the primary drawbacks to 
Equal Protection challenges to election laws; it is incredibly rare for politicians to explicitly admit their aim to 
discriminate against a particular group). 
113 Id. at 235-42. 
114 Id. at 243-44. 
115 Id. at 244 (quoting Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 554 (6th Cir. 2014)). 
116 Id. (referring specifically to League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 240 (4th Cir. 
2014), and Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d at 554). 
117 Veasey, 830 F.3d at 244. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 245. 
121 Id.at 246. 
122 Id. at 256. 
123 Id. at 257-58. 
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official discrimination (Senate factor 1), as they had racially gerrymandered in every re-
districting process since 1970.124  Additionally, they noted the longstanding discrimina-
tion present in Texas prior to the Civil Rights Era, acknowledging that while this had 
“less force than more contemporary evidence,” it could still weigh in favor of a finding 
of official discrimination.125 
The court also confirmed the lower court’s findings on the presence of racially po-
larized voting (Senate Factor 2) and significant effects from past discrimination (Senate 
Factor 5).126  In Texas, racially polarized voting existed in 252 of Texas’ 254 counties, 
amply meeting the Gingles test.127  The court also noted that there were significant dis-
parities in “education, employment, and health” between Texas’ white population and 
minorities, which could be attributed to historic discrimination.128  These factors, in the 
view of the court, could reasonably impede the ability of some minority individuals to 
effectively participate politically.129 
In light of the foregoing considerations, as well as several others,130 the Fifth Circuit 
determined that in light of the “totality of the circumstances,” the District Court’s holding 
that SB 14 had a discriminatory effect on minorities was well founded.131  The court es-
pecially highlighted the fact that the law “specifically burdens Texans living in poverty, 
who are less likely to possess qualified photo ID, are less able to get it, and may not 
otherwise need it,” and further, that these persons were disproportionately more likely to 
be minorities.132 
In Veasey, the court clearly considered Texas’ long history of official and private 
discrimination relevant to evaluating the discriminatory nature of the statute.  Their as-
sessment of the present effects of historical discrimination, even more distant discrimina-
tion, represents a willingness on the part of the court to incorporate the more broad effects 
of systemic racism into their analysis of Section 2.  This willingness stands in stark con-
trast to that displayed by several appellate courts in formerly non-covered jurisdictions, 
as will be discussed below. 
Veasey illustrates clearly the importance of a history of official discrimination in 
demonstrating a discriminatory effect under Section 2 of the VRA.  Another case out of 
the Fourth Circuit, North Carolina Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, serves to further 
highlight this trend.133  There, the North Carolina legislature, dominated by Republicans, 
passed an “omnibus” election bill immediately after the U.S. Supreme Court struck down 
 
124 Id. at 257. 
125 Id. at 258. 
126 Id. at 258-59. 
127 Id. at 258. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 259. 
130 See id. at 263. Specifically, evidence regarding the lack of responsiveness of the legislature towards the needs 
of minorities and the pre-textual nature of the rationale behind the passage of SB 14, pointing to evidence that 
the legislature’s concerns about undocumented immigrants voting were “misplaced,” and noted that the legis-
lature failed to incorporate any ameliorative measures into the bill, despite their knowledge that the law was 
likely to reduce turnout. 
131 Id. at 264. 
132 Id. (quoting Veasey v. Perry, 71 F.Supp.3d 627, 664 (S.D. Tex. 2014)). 
133 831 F.3d 204 (2016). 
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the preclearance regime in Shelby.134  This law imposed tighter restrictions on a number 
of registration and voting procedures, including reducing the number of eligible govern-
ment IDs, eliminating a week of early voting, ending the practice of same-day registra-
tion, eliminating provisional pre-registration for older teenagers, and declaring invalid 
ballots mistakenly cast in the right county, but the wrong precinct.135  
On the same day the bill passed, a variety of civil rights advocacy groups, including 
the North Carolina chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (“NAACP”), filed actions challenging the law in federal court.136  Along with 
alleging violations of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, these challengers’ pri-
mary contention was that the law produced a discriminatory result in violation of Section 
2 of the VRA.137  After a variety of procedural twists and turns,138 the District Court 
entered judgment against the claimants, ruling that the law effected no discriminatory 
results under Section 2.139 
Upon appeal, the Fourth Circuit sought to determine whether the law was enacted 
with “racially discriminatory intent” in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and Sec-
tion 2 of the VRA.140  The court began with two preliminary considerations, first pointing 
out that appellate courts are empowered to reverse “clearly erroneous” factual determi-
nations on the part of inferior courts, and that in some cases, need not even remand that 
factual issue to the lower court.141  Second, the court noted that a facially neutral law, like 
the omnibus voting bill, can be “motivated by invidious racial discrimination,” and that 
such laws are “just as abhorrent   . . . as laws that expressly discriminate on the basis of 
race.”142   
After discussing the legal standards required to make a showing of racial intent in 
the passage of a statute,143 the court elaborated on some “principles” to be utilized in 
adjudicating a Section 2 claim. 144  In particular, the court noted that as a threshold matter 
for demonstrating a violation of Section 2, a plaintiff must establish that voting in the 
relative jurisdiction is racially polarized.145  The court went on to argue that while “[u]sing 
race as a proxy for party may be an effective way to win . . . [but] intentionally targeting 
a particular race’s access to the franchise because its members vote for a particular party 
. . . constitutes discriminatory purpose.146 
The court then turned to discussing the substance of the plaintiff’s claim under the 
VRA, beginning with the assertion that evaluating a violation of Section 2 requires a 
 
134 N.C. Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214 (2016). 
135 Id. at 216-219. 
136 Id. at 218. 
137 Id.  
138 See id. at 218-219. Several preliminary injunctions were issued staying the law’s implementation due to the 
immanence of the 2014 mid-term elections, but the law finally went into effect in March of 2016.  
139 Id. at 219. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 219-20. 
142 Id. at 220. 
143 Id. at 220-21, particularly in relation to demonstrating a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection guarantees. 
144 Id. at 223. 
145 Id. at 221 (citing one of the Senate Factors). 
146 Id. at 222. 
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consideration of “‘[the] historical background of the decision’ challenged as racially dis-
criminatory.”147  Pointing out North Carolina’s long history of official discrimination and 
race-based voting laws, the court concluded that the District Court had erred in “ignoring 
or minimizing” this reality.148  The court further chided the lower court for “inexplicably” 
failing to take North Carolina’s past history into account, noting that the lower court bla-
tantly dismissed this history by making the curious finding that “there [was] little evi-
dence of official discrimination since the 1980s.”149  The Fourth Circuit found this deter-
mination by the District Court clearly erroneous, pointing to the numerous instances 
plaintiffs successfully challenging governmental vote denial and dilution measures in 
North Carolina following the 1980s.150   
While the court went on to discuss the disparate negative impact of the bill on the 
access of African-Americans to the vote, as well as the sequence of events surrounding 
the bill’s passage,151 the core of its holding rested on the fact that the state demonstrated 
a clear history of official discrimination.  These historical “contextual facts,” concluded 
the court, revealed the law’s true discriminatory purpose, aimed at suppressing the “un-
precedented” levels of African American turnout in the past election cycles.152  As a re-
sult,153 the Fourth Circuit reversed the holding of the District Court and remanded the 
case for a permanent injunction staying the enforcement of the law.154 
In both Veasey and N.C. Conf., the courts ruled that the respective state voting laws 
violated the provisions of Section 2 of the VRA, and permanently enjoined their enforce-
ment.  While the courts took note of the current effects of historical discrimination and 
the disparate impact of the laws on African Americans and minorities, they focused their 
analyses on the evidences of historical official discrimination on the part of the state and 
local governments.  By concentrating their attention on the state’s historical discrimina-
tion, rather than on the Senate Factors probing the negative effects of current private dis-
crimination, both courts seemed to implicitly prioritize evidence of historical official dis-
crimination over indicia of the effects of recent private discrimination. 
Further evidence of this implicit judicial prioritization lies in the fact that both laws 
passed in jurisdictions previously under the preclearance regime, due to their long history 
of suppressing the votes of African Americans.155  This history provided the crucial evi-
dence of past official discrimination on the part of the state government that the courts 
found dispositive to demonstrating a violation of Section 2.  As will be demonstrated 
 
147 Id. at 223 (quoting Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977)). 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 223 (quoting N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d 320, 497 (M.D.N.C. 2016)). 
150 Id. 
151 See id. at 227-28. The court found it particularly indicting that Republican legislators crafted the bill specif-
ically to inhibit the forms of registration and voter ID more commonly utilized by African American voters. For 
example, while many forms of ID commonly possessed by whites were considered sufficient, public assistance 
IDs which “a reasonable legislator . . . could have surmised that African Americans would be more likely to 
possess . . .” (quoting N.C. Conf. 182 F. Supp. 3d at 497). See also id. at 229-30. 
152 Id. at 226. 
153 See id. at 219. The court also held that the law violated the Fourteenth Amendment, determining that the law 
had been passed with discriminatory intent in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 
154 Id. at 242. 
155 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Jurisdictions Previously Covered by Section 5, www.justice.gov (August 6, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/crt/jurisdictions-previously-covered-section-5. 
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below, plaintiffs in states without this history of state-sponsored vote suppression fared 
differently. 
In 2014, the Ohio legislature enacted Senate Bill 205 (“SB 205”) and Senate Bill 216 
(“SB 216”), which made significant changes to provisional voting and absentee processes 
in Ohio precincts.156  SB 205 prohibited any election official from helping voters fill out 
an absentee ballot, short of serious disabilities.157  The bill also required voters to fill out 
absentee ballot identification envelopes completely, including mandatory information 
such as their name, address, birthdate, signature, and ID form.158  Previously, this infor-
mation was requested, not required, giving election officials discretion as to which ballots 
to accept.159  Additionally, the bill mandated that election officials mark as incomplete 
any ballot containing information that did not exactly match that in the voter’s registration 
file, notifying the voter that they have seven days after the election to cure the defect.160   
The second bill, SB 216, shortened the cure period for ineligible provisional ballots 
from ten days to seven.161  Within that shortened period, voters were not allowed to cure 
any defects other than those relating to a failure to provide a correct driver’s license num-
ber, social security information, or identification.162  Furthermore, the election board is 
under no obligation to notify a voter that their ballot was improperly prepared or 
marked.163 
Several groups, including the Ohio Democratic Party (“ODP”) and several non-profit 
organizations for the homeless (“charities”) challenged the law in federal court.164  ODP 
claimed that the heightened requirements of the law would place a significant burden on 
their efforts to educate and register groups of voters.165  The charities alleged that the laws 
will have a serious detrimental effect on the ability of homeless persons in Ohio to vote, 
as illiteracy levels are very high, and their problems in filling out the voting forms with 
perfect accuracy are “pervasive and profound.”166  Additionally, the charities alleged that 
the law’s new requirements would significantly divert their resources and constitute a 
heavy burden on their efforts on behalf of Ohio’s homeless population.167 
At trial, the plaintiffs introduced statistical and witness evidence in support of their 
claim that the bill placed a negative impact on voters generally, and specifically a dispar-
ate impact on minority voters.168  Expert testimony revealed that according to a controlled 
study, minorities were more likely to cast provisional ballots than whites, and they were 
 
156 Ne. Oh. Coal. For the Homeless v. Husted, No. 2:06-CV-896, 2016 WL 3166251, 1 (S.D. Ohio June 7, 
2016). 
157 Id. at 11. Acceptable forms of disability include illiteracy, blindness, or disability. 
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160 Id. 
161 Id. at 12. 
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163 Id.  
164 Id. at 1, 6-8.  
165 Id. at 8. 
166 Id. at 7.  
167 Id. at 7-8.  
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more likely to have both their provisional and absentee ballots rejected than whites, sug-
gesting that the law disparately impacted their ability to have their votes counted.169  The 
plaintiffs also introduced testimony from numerous individuals whose votes were re-
jected because of mistakes they considered to be “very minor and obvious,” such as ac-
cidentally switching the month and day categories in the birthdate field.170  Furthermore, 
none of these voters were notified that their ballots had been filled out incorrectly, giving 
them no chance to correct these errors.171   
The District Court’s VRA Section 2 analysis opened with an acknowledgment that 
the statistical evidence suggested a negative disparate impact on minority voters resulting 
from the laws, requiring a further examination of the law in light of the Senate Factors.172  
The court began with Senate Factor 5, referring to the “extent to which members of the 
minority group . . . bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employ-
ment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political pro-
cess,” holding that this factor applied to the situation of a disproportionate share of Ohio’s 
homeless population, as well as Ohio’s African American population generally.173  The 
court found that African Americans in Ohio faced disproportionately adverse outcomes 
in terms of employment, poverty, income, professional advancement, education, health, 
housing, loan disbursement, and many other categories, stemming from a long history of 
structural, official, and individual prejudice.174 
The court then turned to an analysis of the law in light of Senate Factor 1, which 
denoted “the extent of any history of official [voting-related] discrimination in the state . 
. . .”175  The court pointed to Ohio’s nineteenth century history of explicit discrimination 
against African Americans in the voting process, as well as the state’s official discrimi-
nation against minority voters well into the twentieth century.176  While the court noted 
that Ohio was not subjected to the preclearance regime of the VRA in the 1960s, the state 
had passed voter ID laws that were enjoined due to their discriminatory effect.177  In the 
eyes of the District Court, the law’s effects combined with recent vote-suppressive actions 
by the Ohio legislature served to demonstrate the continued relevance of official discrim-
ination in Ohio.178 
After analyzing the evidence and relevant legal standards, the court applied the two-
part judicial framework for Section 2,179 determining that 1) the plaintiffs amply demon-
strated the disproportionate negative impact of the two bills on African American voters, 
and 2) according to their analysis of the Senate Factors, all of them (except for factor 4) 
favored a finding that both laws “interact with social and historical conditions to decrease 
 
169 Id. at 21. 
170 Id. at 14-16. 
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172 Id. at 24-25. 
173 Id. at 25. 
174 Id. at 26. 
175 Id. at 25.  
176 Id. at 27-29. 
177 Id. at 29. 
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179 See discussion supra notes 73-79. 
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African-Americans’ access to the electoral process.”180  As a result, the District Court 
entered judgment for the plaintiffs on their Section 2 claims.181 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reviewed all VRA-related decisions by the lower 
court.182  Beginning with a reiteration of the two-part framework utilized by the District 
Court, the Sixth Circuit confirmed the absolute necessity of demonstrating a disparate 
impact on minority voters to prevail in a Section 2 claim.  Despite the clearly erroneous 
standard of review governing the appeals process, the court engaged in a rigorous re-
examination of the factual findings of the District Court, particularly in respect to the 
court’s reliance on statistical data to support a finding of disparate impact.183   
The Sixth Circuit’s close re-weighing of the facts in the record resulted in a finding 
that directly contradicted the lower court’s, concluding with a determination that “the 
plaintiffs have not shown that the provision disproportionately affects minority voters.”184  
This determination comprised the entirety of their analysis of the Section 2 claims.185  The 
court concluded that the impact of the law overall was “insignificant;” therefore, the law 
could not disparately impact minority voters.186  In reaching this conclusion, they did not 
analyze any of the District Court’s lengthy discussion of the Senate Factors, seeming to 
understand that the entirety of the case hinged on the fact that the disparate impact was 
insignificant and could therefore not be a violation of Section 2 of the VRA.187   
Judge Keith, writing in dissent, strongly criticized the majority for failing to correctly 
apply the legal standard for disparate impact.188  According to the dissent, the majority 
unjustifiably added a requirement that the discriminatory impact of a law must be “sig-
nificant” in order for the VRA to proscribe its enforcement.189  This standard, argued 
Judge Keith, was incorrect because the VRA does not require “a certain number of af-
fected persons” but looks instead at the impact on minorities as compared to non-minor-
ities.”190 
The dissent’s arguments and the plaintiff’s failure in Ohio Coal highlights the diffi-
culty of prevailing on a Section 2 claim where the outcome depends absolutely on demon-
strating a disparate impact.  While the majority’s baffling decision to reverse the lower 
court’s factual findings somewhat muddies the legal outcome of the case, it is clear that 
the Sixth Circuit did not consider the discriminatory impact of the law significant enough 
to warrant Section 2 protection, in spite of the District Court’s lengthy discussion of the 
racial disparities present in Ohio’s voting population.  While the majority paid lip service 
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to the language of Section 2, the freedom with which they reworked the standard of re-
view and essence of the legal standard to kill the claim “in its infancy” illustrates the 
difficulties posed in demonstrating a violation of the VRA in vote denial cases.191  Not 
only must plaintiffs display a high level of disparate impact from lengthy statistical ag-
gregates, but they must also compete against an uncertain, court-determined threshold for 
what counts as a “significant” impact.192 
Another case within a formerly non-covered jurisdiction, Frank v. Walker, further 
illustrates the difficulties facing plaintiffs in demonstrating a violation of Section 2, par-
ticularly in districts without an obvious recent history of vote discrimination.193  Frank 
involved challenges by voter advocacy groups to a 2011 Wisconsin law requiring all Wis-
consin residents to present a photo ID to vote.194  The District Court addressed only two 
of the plaintiffs’ allegations—namely, that the law placed an unjustifiable burden on the 
right to vote under the Fourteenth Amendment and that the law violates Section 2 of the 
VRA.195 
The law in question required voters to present one of nine possible forms of photo 
ID in order to participate in the election, including a driver’s license, a passport, or a 
student ID from an accredited Wisconsin university, among others.196  Notably, the law 
prohibited the use of IDs issued by Veterans Affairs or state technical colleges.197  Similar 
to the Ohio law, ballots cast without an appropriate ID were considered provisional, to be 
counted only if the voter presented the appropriate form by Friday of the week following 
the election.198  Voters lacking the necessary ID could obtain one by presenting “primary 
identification documents” at a Wisconsin DMV service center.199   
The court’s Section 2 analysis outlined the difficulty in constructing the appropriate 
test in instances of vote denial, rather than vote dilution.200  After reviewing the applica-
bility of the Senate Factors to instances of vote dilution, the court concluded that these 
tests were not relevant to vote denial claims as they were adopted in the context of vote 
dilution.201  In the absence of this guidance, the court determined to “focus on the text of 
the statute.”202  The resulting test adopted by the court stated that Section 2 “protects 
against a voting practice that creates a barrier to voting that is more likely to appear in the 
path of a voter if that voter is a member of a minority group than if he or she is not.”203 
After establishing this standard, the District Court examined the evidence to deter-
mine whether Wisconsin’s ID requirement was “more likely to appear in the path” of a 
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minority voter.204  The court recounted the testimony of several expert witnesses to the 
effect that minorities in Wisconsin were less likely to possess the requisite ID.205  This 
testimony, according to the court, convincingly demonstrated that the negative effects of 
the law were more likely to impact minorities.206 
While the defendants conceded this point, they argued that a violation would require 
a showing that minorities are “incapable” of obtaining qualifying IDs.207  The court re-
jected this argument, stating that “no authority supports defendants’ view of the law,” as 
the cases cited by defendants on this case merely demonstrate that a disproportionate im-
pact on minorities must be tied “in some way to the effects of discrimination.”208  The 
court also pointed to the fact that even “small increases” in the costs of voting can have a 
major deterrent effect. Thus, total impossibility is not a useful standard for evaluating the 
impact of election laws heightening the requirements on voters.209  Furthermore, even the 
ability of minorities, in theory, to obtain the state-issued voting ID is undercut by lower 
rates of ownership of the required underlying documents (such as birth certificates).210 
The court noted that while a showing of disparate impact did not require plaintiffs to 
demonstrate a total barrier to voter access, Section 2 did require plaintiffs to connect that 
disparate impact to the effects of “past or present discrimination.”211  Reviewing the evi-
dence related to racial disparities in the areas of wealth and income, the court found that 
the increased rates of poverty and unemployment in minority communities demonstrated 
that the Wisconsin law was “more likely to burden” minority voters.212  This finding, 
combined with the court’s other Fourth Amendment holdings, led the court to enjoin the 
enforcement of the law.213 
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the court reframed the two-part test for establishing 
a violation of Section 2.214  First, the challenged law must “impose a discriminatory bur-
den on members of a protected class, meaning that members of the protected class ‘have 
less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process 
and to elect representatives of their choice.’”215  The second step stated that the burden 
“must in part be caused by or linked to ‘social and historical conditions’ that have or 
currently produce discrimination against members of the protected class.”216  While the 
court claimed to adopt this standard as binding, it remained “skeptical” about the second 
portion of the test because it failed to distinguish between official and unofficial discrim-
ination.217 
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The court then evaluated the findings of the District Court in light of the first step of 
the Section 2 framework.  The court noted that the District Court failed to find that a large 
number of eligible voters were unable to obtain a qualifying ID despite attempting to 
procure one, indicating that voters, despite obstacles, were still technically capable of 
acquiring the required ID.218  Second, the court pointed out that the record contained no 
evidence of the effects of voter ID laws in other states on minority turnout, which would 
provide “[a]ctual results” which are “more significant than litigants’ predictions.”219  
Nonetheless, the court accepted the lower court’s finding that the law had a disparate 
outcome on minority voters in Wisconsin.220 
Though the circuit court tentatively accepted the lower court’s finding of a disparate 
impact, they disagreed that the law’s negative effects were “traceable to the effects of 
discrimination in areas such as education, employment, and housing.”221  The court 
pointed out that the district judge did not find that the state of Wisconsin itself had dis-
criminated against minorities in these areas.222  This finding, argued the court, was criti-
cal, as “governments are responsible for their own discrimination, but not for rectifying 
the effects of other persons’ discrimination.”223  As a result, the court found that the plain-
tiff’s claim failed the second portion of the Section 2 test. 
Throughout the case, the court’s arguments seemed to suggest an underlying presup-
position—namely, that the effects of current and historical private discrimination, even 
those that result in a disparate impact on the ability of minorities to vote, are not relevant 
to determining whether a law violates Section 2.  Early on in the case, the court suggested 
that the term “disenfranchised” did not properly apply to Wisconsin voters who lacked 
IDs, as the possible reason they were without the required IDs was their “unwilling[ness] 
to invest the necessary time” due to the fact that in the court’s view, “registering to vote 
in Wisconsin is easy.”224  In addition to inexplicably focusing on registration procedures 
as opposed to the ID requirement, this statement seems to dismiss the lower court’s fac-
tual determination that it is not “easy” for everyone to obtain IDs; rather, it is dispropor-
tionately difficult for minorities.   
Furthermore, while refusing to consider the record in light of the Senate Factors re-
lated to socioeconomic disparities and racially-polarized elections, the court argued that 
in light of the totality of the circumstances, “blacks do not seem to be disadvantaged by 
Wisconsin’s electoral system as a whole,” as they turned out to vote in higher rates than 
whites.  In addition to seemingly suggesting that Section 2 could not be violated as long 
as African Americans maintained high turnout rates, this argument seems to indicate a 
belief on the part of the court that evidence of partial success for some in minority com-
munities serves to absolve the government from any responsibility to other minority cit-
izens who lack access to the vote.225  
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Curiously, and most tellingly, the court gave no explanation for their seeming depar-
ture from the language of the Section 2 test, despite their insertion of a requirement that 
the disparate impact must be the result of current official discrimination.226  The court 
does, however, appear to assume the conclusion of the very question at issue in the second 
portion of the test—namely, whether voters of different races in Wisconsin had equal 
opportunity to access qualifying IDs.  The court, while explaining its skepticism about 
the second part of Section 2’s test, stated that “in vote dilution cases . . . the government 
itself draws the district lines; no one else bears responsibility;” while in this case, the 
discriminatory act is not attributable to the government, because in Wisconsin, “everyone 
has the same opportunity to get a qualifying photo ID.”   
In framing the case this way, the court appears to be making an a priori determination 
that voter-IDs are equally obtainable by all members of the population, regardless of the 
effects of racial discrimination. Therefore, the government’s requirement that photo-IDs 
be presented at the polling place could not violate Section 2.  This reasoning seems to 
reflect an underlying assumption on the part of the court that the effects of current and 
historical private discrimination, even if they result in a disparate impact on the ability of 
minorities to vote, are not relevant to determining whether a law violates Section 2.  This 
critical determination colors the entirety of the court’s analysis, and results in a law that 
appears to satisfy both portions of the Section 2 test, but to no avail for the plaintiffs.227  
In light of this determination, the court reversed the lower court’s holding, ruling that the 
law conformed to the requirements laid out in Section 2.228   
The foregoing cases provide a small picture of what seems to be a broader trend: 
Section 2 operates much more effectively in states with a historical connection to the 
preclearance regime, and a demonstrated history of official discrimination.  As Section 2 
is the most important remaining pillar of the VRA, a failure on its part to curtail the effects 
of discriminatory laws represents a failure of the whole of the VRA.  Despite the fact that 
these legal disputes revolved around similar laws, with similar disparate impacts on mi-
nority voting rights in their respective states, the courts came to different conclusions 
based on the same test.  These results suggest that a reexamination and possible replace-
ment may be in order for the VRA. 
CONCLUSION 
 The right to vote is fundamental to our democratic system, and a failure to pre-
serve the voting rights of any Americans results is a failure to protect those of all Ameri-
cans.229  Despite the incredible successes of the VRA in the latter half of the twentieth 
century, the challenges presented by a new generation of vote denial laws, combined with 
the death of the preclearance regime, have left the landmark statute unable to defend vot-
ing rights in the future.  Without the preclearance regime, voters are left to the uncertain 
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and expensive whims of the justice system in states with deep histories of official dis-
crimination and must resort to the murky and ineffective provisions of Section 2 to defend 
their rights.  Furthermore, as the cases above reveal, even this protection seems highly 
bound to regional considerations and judicial caprices.   
The failures of the VRA to combat the new forms of vote denial suggest that a mere 
reworking of its provisions will not be sufficient.  As others have noted, there are signif-
icant political and legal hurdles to either revising the coverage formula or strengthening 
the Section 2 test.230  Politically, representatives in districts likely to come under the reach 
of the new formula are unlikely to vote against the interests of their districts.231  The best 
alternative may lie in a legislative compromise like the one proposed by Daniel Tokaji, 
which involves comprehensive voting reform connected to fraud measures (i.e. voter 
ID).232  Such a plan would place affirmative obligations on state and local governments 
to ensure maximum registration and provide voters with the requisite identification to 
vote, while simultaneously proposing standardized voter ID requirements and procedures 
to assuage those concerned about voter fraud.233  Regardless of the exact method, a more 
robust protection of voting rights is crucial to ensuring that minorities and the disadvan-
taged have access to our institutions. 
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